Gassendi or his printer for (*non*) *nisi*, the sense being "since knowledge only enters by a sort of invasion, though it is elaborated," etc. I think this more conformable to the known opinions of Gassendi as well as better Latin than the printed text, and the dropping of *non* is a mistake of which there are several instances in the early editions of the *Objections*.

Page 155, line 4, a *not* has been omitted by oversight; read, "those Ideas nevertheless (do not) prove," etc. (*non tamen arguere*).

Page 161, line 6, the words *as long as* should be deleted. What follows, "you decrease the image's reality," is the grammatical and logical consequent in the sentence. The meaning is that on any theory which denies that "ideas" are corporeal effluxes from things, the reality of the idea is of a lower degree than on the corporeal effluence theory of Epicurus—and Gassendi.

Page 190, note 2. No "emendation" is called for. *Sigillatim*, which Descartes almost certainly wrote, is only a very common MSS. misspelling of *singillatim*, not a different word.

Page 195, line 20. "*But, how, O Mind*," etc. Surely *how* is a printer's mistake for *now*. The sentence also appears not to be meant as a question. Render, as Dr. Ross very possibly wrote, "*But now* . . . there is no difficulty".

Page 197, line "*is that why*," etc. Read simply, "have you a clear and distinct idea about this?" (*idcirco, viz.*, a clear and distinct idea of what it is to be unextended).

Page 200, note 1, the reference should be to Lucretius I., 305.

Page 293, line , "*each enjoys his own sensation*". Rather "his own conviction" (L., *suo sensu abundat*), Gassendi, means that he is content to leave other men to be as partial as they like to their own favourite *philosophies*, so long as they will leave him to enjoy his own.

Page 233, line 3. "I catch sight of the real Gassendi, and have ground for suspecting that he is a man of great philosophical eminence. Translation, "and *look up* to him as a man," etc., Dr. Ross forgets that *suspicio* rarely or never means "to suspect," except in the participle.

Page 367, note . The note is unfortunately worded. The Latin for Utrecht is not, of course, *Ultrajectinae* but *Ultrajectum*; *ultrajectinus* is an adjective like *Florentinus* or *Byzantinus*. Moreover the case of the adjective to be supplied in the place of Descartes' asterisks is the genitive singular *masculine* (*Iudicium sub nomine Senatus Academici* [*Ultrajectini*] *editum*).

It will be seen that the number of necessary emendations I have to submit is not large for a volume of nearly 400 large octavo pages, and that most of them deal with what are obviously typographical errors.

A. E. TAYLOR.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1911-1912. Published by Williams & Norgate. Pp. 345.

The *Proceedings* of this society for the past year are somewhat swollen by the presence of two Symposia—one on "The Time Difficulty in Realist Theories of Perception" and the other on "Mechanism and Purpose". In the first of these the question is whether the fact that we 'see a star' by light which it emitted some time before the moment of our perception is compatible with the view that we really become directly aware of the star itself.

Mr. CARR, who opens the discussion, very unnecessarily drags in Einstein and the theory of relativity. He holds that the real question is

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'where our perceptions can be'. As he says that on the realist theory they must be where the astronomical star is, he apparently means *percepts* by perceptions. He further holds that the time-interval makes it obvious that they cannot be at the astronomical star but must be in the perceiver. Otherwise they must exist before they are perceived, which he holds to be self-contradictory. But it is certainly not self-contradictory that a percept should exist unperceived, for the realist theory holds that precisely the same things exist sometimes perceived and sometimes unperceived. Nor is it self-contradictory that a perception should exist unperceived; for, except when we deliberately introspect, all our perceptions are in this state. The real point at issue is in fact a very simple one, and deals with time and not directly with space. It is just this: It seems obvious that the existence of an object of direct awareness is contemporary with the existence of the awareness of it. If the usual interpretation of physical theories be right it would be possible to have a perception due to a distant source of light at a finite time after that source had ceased to exist. Hence the object of this perception cannot be identical with the source of light which causes the perception. But naïve realism asserts this identity.

Mr. Carr's solution is based on Bergson, and, in common with the other participants in the Symposium, I am quite unable to follow it. I also subscribe most heartily to Dr. Dawes Hicks' criticisms of Bergson's apparent attempt to identify colours with vibrations. As far as I can see the crux of Mr. Carr's argument consists in the remark: 'If you object that the image no longer exists when you are perceiving it, you are bound to hold that no movement exists because the part accomplished has ceased to be and the part in progress is not yet'. If this be meant as an argument to show that we must assume that the past exists in some sense, I agree that it does: it still exists, but its existence which was present has become past. But this does not answer the question whether there can be a perception of an existent whose existence is not contemporary with that of the perception itself. And this is really the question at issue. If I had to defend naïve realism I should take the line that a present perception can have a past existent for its object and then try to show how it is that we make an erroneous judgment as to their temporal relations.

Prof. Jevons discusses the question on the lines that the star that sends out the light is a concept and that which is seen is a percept. This seems to me to amount to an admission that the difficulty is fatal to naïve realism, for what is perceived is not the concept, whilst it is the concept that the realist wants us to perceive.

The most exciting solution is that of Dr. Dawes Hicks, who holds that in all cases what we perceive is the sun as it is when we receive the light, though the stimulus comes from the sun as it was earlier. If in the meanwhile the sun has been annihilated we do not perceive anything in spite of the arrival of the stimulus from the past sun. I agree with Mr. Carr that this view makes the whole supposition that the past sun had has anything to do with the causation of our perception of the present one very arbitrary. Suppose that the sun exploded at a certain moment and that by the time the light sent out just before the explosion reached us pieces of it were widely distributed. Should we see them all in the positions they had reached? If not, how little must the present sun differ from the past one in order that a stimulus from the past one may enable us to see it? And in general, if Dr. Hicks's account be true, I do not see what evidence remains that light has a velocity at all. The usual ground for supposing that it has a velocity is aberration; but I do not see that there would be aberration on Dr. Hick's view—or, rather, some

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explanation would be needed for that phenomenon which would cease to make it available as evidence for the finite velocity of light.

Mr. Russell contributes an important paper on "Universals and Particulars". He investigates the question whether we can dispense with universals or with particulars. He shows that at any rate we must assume universal relations on pain of a vicious infinite regress, and then there is no advantage in denying universal qualities. With regard to universals he shows that even in perceptual space there exist relations (like 'inside') which imply diversity in their terms and yet can relate terms that are conceptually identical. Hence you can have numerical difference with conceptual identity, and so you must distinguish between a universal and its particular instances. The paper contains much interesting discussion as to the nature of purely sensible extension as distinct from the intellectually constructed space which synthesises the several sensible spaces, and is as such never directly perceived.

There is a good article by Dr. Nunn on Animism and Energy. He traces the development of the conservation view from pure mechanics to physics and thence to metaphysics. He insists on what seems to me to be the most important point, that it is of no use to save the Conservation of Energy in the interest of mechanics unless you also save the Conservation of Momentum, a thing which all guidance theories *ex hypothesi* fail to do. Dr. Nunn holds that in the physical sense of Conservation all that is needed is that two classes of events, *e.g.*, one defined by the fact that $\frac{1}{2}mv^2 = \kappa$, and another defined by the fact that the heat liberated is constant, shall be capable of correlation. If then we could get classes of mental events which would be correlated in this way with physical classes Conservation would hold even if there were interaction. He thinks that the determining mark of such classes need not be the constance of some quantity, but he does not indicate how we are to form our psychical classes, and so the discussion is somewhat in the air.

In the Symposium on Purpose and Mechanism, Profs Sorley, Bosanquet and Ward, and Mr. Lindsay took part. It is not possible to summarise such a long discussion, which came to involve the question in what sense purpose can be applied to the whole universe Profs. Ward and Bosanquet join issue as to whether finite purpose is enough and as to whether there is any genuine mechanism, but neither has persuaded the other. What is curious is how very materialistically some of Prof Bosanquet's pronouncements read.

There are two papers on Logic, one on Memory and Imagery, a description of Prof. Santayana's *Life of Reason*, and a long paper on 'The Experience of Power' in which Prof. Boyce Gibson introduces us to two French philosophers, Maine de Biran and De Tracy. On the whole, a quite entertaining volume of *Proceedings* of which the Society has no cause to be ashamed.

C. D. Broad.

The Psychology of Insanity. By Bernard Hart, M.D. Published in Cambridge Science and Literature Series.

In this little book the author gives an account of recent psychological theory of insanity, modified in certain respects by the results of his own experience with the insane. The hypotheses of Freud form the basis of the theory advanced, though it is also indebted to Jung and Trotter, the author criticising freely where the facts seem to require it. An interesting feature of the result is that the consideration of physiological conditions obtaining in insanity is entirely eliminated. Attention is confined

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